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The International Legality of U.S. Military Cross-Border
Operations from Afghanistan into Pakistan
Sean D. Murphy*
I.

Introduction

An aspect of U.S. military involvement in Afghanistan since 2001 has been the conduct
of cross-border U.S. operations from Afghanistan into Pakistan, undertaken for the purposes of
striking at the camps, compounds, and convoys of Al Qaeda and Taliban elements based in
Pakistan, and of defending against cross-border attacks and infiltration by those militants from
Pakistan into Afghanistan. As a matter of scale, U.S. cross-border operations are far less
momentous than operations that seek to topple a de jure government (as occurred when the
United States intervened in Iraq in 2003, ousting the government of Saddam Hussein) or a de
facto government (as occurred when the United States intervened in Afghanistan in 2001,
displacing the largely-unrecognized government of the Taliban). Nevertheless, these smallerscale cross-border attacks on non-state actors, though they entail less intrusive and more
temporary projections of force, implicate important issues of sovereignty, stability, and selfdefense, and raise difficult questions about the role of law in regulating low intensity conflict.

* Patricia Roberts Harris Research Professor of Law, George Washington University Law
School. My thanks to Polly Nayak and Jon Shaub for extremely insightful comments on the
complicated circumstances of Afghan-Pakistani relations, and to Erin Creegan for superb
research assistance. All mistakes, of course, are my own.
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This essay discusses the nature of these cross-border operations for the purpose of
assessing their legality under the jus ad bellum, meaning their consistency with the norms
embodied in Articles 2(4) and 51 of the U.N. Charter. Attention is devoted to unpacking the
complicated and evolving circumstances on the ground, but the facts at issue in many instances
are quite difficult to discern, and hence can support only tentative legal conclusions. While the
focus here will principally be on U.S. operations from Afghanistan into Pakistan from 2002 to
the present, the analysis is relevant in other contexts as well, such as Turkey’s cross-border
operations in northern Iraq against Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) or Colombia’s recent forays
into Ecuador against the Revolution Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC).

Among other things, this essay assumes that analyzing the jus ad bellum legality of U.S.
cross-border operations into Pakistan is important to the United States. U.S. law and policy, of
course, generally call for compliance with international law in the conduct of U.S. military
operations. Further, the United States’ ability to secure the cooperation of other states may turn
on whether U.S. operations are in compliance with international law. Support from U.S. allies
includes support from Pakistan itself, in that most cargo and much fuel supporting the
approximately thirty thousand U.S. forces that are based in land-locked Afghanistan transit
through Pakistan.1 Indeed, in September 2008, the Pakistani government threatened to close
down U.S. supply routes into Afghanistan in response to U.S. cross-border operations, prompting

1

See Congressional Research Service, Pakistan-U.S. Relations 24 (Aug. 25, 2008), at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33498.pdf [hereinafter “CRS Report”]; Ann Scott Tyson,
Gates Is Pessimistic On Pakistani Support, WASH. POST, Sept. 24, 2008, at A16 (reporting
comments of Senators Carl Levin and John Warner).

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1296733

3
the United States to rethink its strategy in this area.2 Broader U.S. objectives of maintaining a
stable Pakistan—an objective arguably paramount for the United States in combating
terrorism3—may turn in part on internal Pakistani perceptions concerning the legality of U.S.
conduct. Moreover, though adjudication of the legality of U.S. cross-border operations before an
inter-state tribunal, such as the International Court of Justice, may not be likely, it is not
impossible, and adverse rulings may affect the ability of the United States to maintain both
domestic and international support for its policies.4 Finally, the states parties to the Rome
Statute5 establishing the International Criminal Court, at their review conference in 2010, may
activate the ICC’s jurisdiction over the crime of aggression, thereby potentially exposing U.S.
military personnel engaged in such cross-border operations to international criminal liability.6
For all these reasons, there is value in assessing the legality of U.S. cross-border operations
against Pakistan under the jus ad bellum.

II.

U.S. Cross-Border Operations from Afghanistan to Pakistan
2

See Sean D. Naylor, Spec Ops Raids Into Pakistan Halted, NAVY TIMES, Sept. 29, 2008.
See Polly Nayak, The Impact of Pakistan’s and Bangladesh’s National Strategies on
U.S. Interests, in STRATEGIC ASIA 2008-09: CHALLENGES AND CHOICES 297, 318-20 (Ashley J.
Tellis, Merch Kuo & Andrew Marble eds., 2008).
4
For instance, Pakistan might invoke against the United States the 1959 bilateral Treaty
of Friendship and Commerce, U.S.-Pak., Nov. 12, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 110, which provides for
International Court of Justice jurisdiction when disputes arise. Iran and Nicaragua have both
invoked similar treaties against the United States in response to U.S. military or paramilitary
operations.
5
See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3.
6
The exact mechanism for applying the crime of aggression in a given circumstance is
not yet known, though ICC jurisdiction might be triggered based on decision-making at the ICC
itself (without affirmative action at Security Council) in circumstances where the alleged
aggression is undertaken from or against a party to the Rome Statute. At present, Afghanistan is
a party to the Rome Statute, while the United States and Pakistan are not. See International
3
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A.

The Afghan-Pakistan Border in Law

The 2,250 kilometer-long border between Afghanistan and Pakistan was essentially
established in 1893 by Sir Henry Mortimer Durand, a civil servant and diplomat of colonial
British India. The purpose of the line (which became known as the “Durand line”) was to delimit
British colonial holdings in India from Afghanistan, since Pakistan did not yet exist as a nation
state. The standard account is that the Durand line was negotiated with and accepted by the Amir
of Afghanistan, Abdur Rahman Khan, and when Pakistan achieved national independence in
1947, Pakistan succeeded to that border.7

The border, however, is not without some controversy. Given that the border divides the
ancestral home of the Pashtun people, the Pashtuns have objected that the border was imposed by
a strong colonial power (Britain) upon a weak state (Afghanistan), which was in no real position
to object. In the years after Pakistani independence, Afghanistan began to voice a view that the
Durand line lapsed with the end of the British colonial rule,8 a position that essentially rejects the
internationally-accepted principle of uti possedetis juris (which maintains that states newly
formed our of colonies should have the same borders that they had before their independence).

Criminal Court, Assembly of States Parties, http://www.icc-cpi.int/asp/statesparties.html.
7
See Percy Sykes, Sir Mortimer Durand 200-217 (1956); MARTIN EWANS,
AFGHANISTAN: A NEW HISTORY 106-107 (2002).
8
See OWEN BENNETT JONES, PAKISTAN: EYE OF THE STORM 137 (2003) (“Ever since
partition, Kabul has argued that the Durand Line was never meant to be an international
boundary and has complained that it deprived Afghanistan of territory that had been historically
under its control.”).

5
The Afghan position is widely accepted within Afghanistan, but has gained no traction in the
international community, and would likely not be accepted by any authoritative decision-makers,
such as the International Court of Justice. By contrast, Pakistan has maintained that the border is
of longstanding legality, is fully demarcated, and largely follows a series of topographic features
that provides for a natural divide.9

In short, the border as a legal construct is well known and accepted within the
international community. As such, arguments in favor significant cross-border operations cannot
credibly justified on grounds of uncertainty as to the location of the border or genuinely disputed
territory; other justifications are necessary.

B.

The Afghan-Pakistan Border in Practice

While the location of the Afghan-Pakistan border is relatively well settled, the
functioning of that border as an effective barrier between the two states is far less so. The
movement of peoples across the border is generally unchecked, with sizable populations of both
Pashtuns and Baluch on both sides of the border moving freely and engaged in extensive

9

For a more detailed discussion of these points and the history of the border, see Barnett
R. Rubin & Abubakar Siddique, Resolving the Pakistan-Afghanistan Stalemate, U.S. Institute of
Peace Spec. Rep. 176 (Oct. 2006).

6

area.

7
smuggling operations that pre-date 2001.10 The graphic11 depicts the border area. On the
Pakistani side of the border, there are certain groups that are the object of U.S. cross-border
operations.

First, there are the remnants of Al Qaeda and other extremist Islamic “foreign fighters”
who fled across the border from Afghanistan after the U.S.-led intervention in the fall of 2001.
U.S. defense officials and independent analysts place the number of Al Qaeda fighters in
Afghanistan at somewhere between 150 and 500 persons.12 Osama Bin Laden is thought to be
hiding among those fighters in the Waziristan region of Pakistan, which is part of the Federally
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) immediately adjacent to the border,13 but his whereabouts
are not confirmed.

Second, there are remains of the Afghan Taliban regime (a predominately Pashtun
movement) that also fled into Pakistan in late 2001, but has reorganized and experienced
10

See RIZWAN HUSSAIN, PAKISTAN AND THE EMERGENCE OF ISLAMIC MILITANCY IN
AFGHANISTAN 55-92 (2005).
11
The graphic appears in Seth Jones, Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, RAND
Counterinsurgency
Study
Vol.
4,
at
45
(June
9,
2008)
at
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG595.pdf, and is reprinted with
permission of RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA.
12
See Eric Schmitt & Mark Mazzetti, Pakistan’s Planned Accord With Militants Alarms
U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 2008, at A10; see also CRS Report, supra note 1, at 20-21; Jones,
supra note 11, at 43-44; National Intelligence Council, National Intelligence Estimate: The
Terrorist Threat to the US Homeland 6 (July 2007),
http://www.dni.gov/press_releases/20070717_release.pdf.
13
U.S. cross-border operations at issue in this paper are focused on the FATA region, not
the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) or Baluchistan. It should be noted, however, that
Pakistani militants have also begun holding territory (and attacking Pakistani military and
government targets) in certain areas of the NWFP.
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resurgence in fomenting guerilla resistance to the new Afghan government and its foreign
supporters, including the United States.14 At present, Afghan insurgent groups based along the
Afghan-Pakistani border straddle both sides of the border, engaging in classic guerrilla warfare
by attacking targets in Afghanistan and then retreating to mountain strongholds on both sides of
the border.15

Third, there is Pakistan’s own Taliban movement (called Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan), led
by Baitullah Mehsud, and consisting of a cluster of Pashtun tribes and clans united principally by
a shared goal of resistance to the Pakistani and U.S. governments. Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan has
established strongholds in North and South Waziristan, and at present there are concerns about
“Talibanization” of the entire western region of Pakistan. While Pakistan’s Taliban is principally
focused on activities within Pakistan, it is also promoting fighting across the border with U.S.
forces in Afghanistan.16

The relationship between Al Qaeda, other militant groups, the Afghan Taliban, and the
Taliban in Pakistan is not entirely transparent, but connections clearly do exist. Many of the
“foreign fighters” in the region take their guidance from senior Al Qaeda leaders and serve as
14

See Jones, supra note 11, at 58-59 (“Afghan insurgents used Pakistan as a staging area
for offensive operations. Taliban insurgents that operated in the southern Afghan provinces of
Kandahar, Oruzgan, Helmand, and Zabol had significant support networks in such Pakistani
provinces as Baluchistan and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, including in Waziristan. .
. . The Taliban conduct much of their financing and recruiting operations on the Pakistani side of
the border.”)
15
See id. at 38, 50-51.
16
CRS Report, supra note 1, at 18-20 & 29. Some believe Baitullah Mehsud
masterminded the assassination of former Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto in December
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“trainers, shock troops, and surrogate leaders for Taliban units in the field.”17 In this way, Al
Qaeda is supporting militants who cross the border into Afghanistan, as well as insurgent groups
in Afghanistan, in their attacks on U.S. and coalition forces, as well as the Afghan government.
A recent RAND report states:
Al Qaeda played a critical role in the [Afghan] insurgency as a force multiplier,
assisting insurgent groups such as the Taliban at the tactical, operational, and strategic
levels. Groups such as the Taliban used support and training from jihadists to construct
increasingly sophisticated [improvised explosive devices [IEDs]], including IEDs with
remote-control detonators. For example, there were a handful of al Qaeda-run training
facilities and IED assembly facilities in such places as North and South Waziristan. . . .
Al Qaeda received operational and financial support from local clerics and Taliban
commanders in Waziristan.18

A Taliban commander characterized the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Pakistan as having “close ties,”
while a U.S. military intelligence official stated that “trying to separate Taliban and al Qaeda in
Pakistan serves no purpose. It’s like picking gray hairs out of your head.” 19

In recent testimony before the U.S. Senate Armed Service Committee, the vice chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General James Cartwright, testified that Islamic militant fighters
crossing the border from the FATA region of Pakistan into Afghanistan account for about 30%
to 40% of the guerilla attacks taking place in Afghanistan against the Afghan government or its

2007. In early October, unconfirmed reports began circulating of Mehsud’s death from illness.
17
See Jones, supra note 11, at 46.
18
Id. at 62-63.
19
Quoted in Peter Bergen, Assessing the Fight Against Al Qaeda, Testimony before the
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, at 8 (Apr. 9, 2008),
http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2008_hr/040908bergen.pdf.
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allies.20 Further, those cross-border attacks (many of which are suicide attacks) from Afghanistan
have been on the rise, from twenty a month in March 2007 to fifty-three a month in April 2008,
with many attacks targeting troops from countries considering whether to withdraw their forces
from Afghanistan, such as Canada and the Netherlands.21 According to the RAND study,
Several factors can be attributed to the rise in suicide attacks. First, the Taliban
successfully tapped into the expertise and training of the broader jihadist community,
especially al Qaeda. Jihadists imparted knowledge on suicide tactics to Afghan groups
through the Internet and in face-to-face visits. With al Qaeda’s assistance, these militants
helped supply a steady stream of suicide bombers. Second, al Qaeda and the Taliban
concluded that suicide bombing was more effective than other tactics in killing Afghan
and coalition forces. 22
The government of Pakistan generally does not control the FATA region, which is
divided into largely autonomous provinces loosely linked to Islamabad by means of a “political
agent” (a vestige of British colonialism). Indeed, the legal relationship is so attenuated that the
ability of the Pakistani government, under Pakistani law, to authorize U.S. military actions in
FATA is not entirely clear. Consequently, prior to the attacks of September 11, 2001, the border
areas were almost entirely in the hands of local tribal groups. After 9/11 and the U.S.-led
intervention in Afghanistan, the United States urged Pakistan’s central government to exercise
greater control over the border areas, which resulted in the Pakistani army reluctantly conducting
20

See Ann Scott Tyson, Gates Is Pessimistic On Pakistani Support, WASH. POST, Sept.
24, 2008, at A16 (reporting testimony of General Cartwright); see also Jones, supra note 11, at
64-65 (“The use of suicide attacks was encouraged by al Qaeda leaders in Pakistan . . . . Suicide
bombers included Afghans, Pakistanis, and some foreigners. Most suicide bombers through
2007came from Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan.”).
21
Jane Perlez, Pakistan Defies U.S. On Halting Attacks, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 2008, at
A6 (referring to NATO and U.S. sources); CRS Report, supra note 1, at 31.
22
See Jones, supra note 11, at 65; see also Bergen, supra note 19, at 7 (“The use of
suicide attacks, improvised explosive devices and the beheadings of hostages—all techniques
that al Qaeda perfected in Iraq—are methods that the Taliban has increasingly adopted in
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some counter-terrorism operations in the FATA against Taliban and Al Qaeda operatives. Those
operations were not effective in eliminating militant groups and caused significant collateral
civilian casualties that inflamed local animosity toward the Pakistani government and army.23
Most military operations have been left to the 80,000-person “Frontier Corps,” a poorly trained
and underfunded paramilitary force consisting of recruits from local Pashtun tribes serving under
regular Pakistani army officers. While these units have sometimes engaged in assaults on Taliban
and Al Qaeda elements in the border areas, there are credible reports (denied by the Pakistani
government) that elements of the Frontier Corps are closely aligned with the Taliban.24 In
response to Pakistani government military operations, the militant groups in FATA began
conducting a series of suicide attacks against various targets in other parts of Pakistan to show
their strength and weaken the Pakistani government, though such attacks may have undermined
support for the militants within the Pakistani population.25

Islamabad’s efforts to “govern” FATA have always entailed deals being struck between
the government, its regional authorities, or the Pakistani army and FATA tribal officials. In the
post-9/11 period, the Pakistani government continued to pursue such deal-making, including
agreements not just with tribal groups but with Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan itself, addressing
Afghanistan, making much of the south of the country a no-go area.”).
23
See HUSAIN HAQQANI, PAKISTAN: BETWEEN MOSQUE AND MILITARY 301-310 (2005);
CRS Report, supra note 1, at 26-27; Jones, supra note 11, at 59-60.
24
See Jones, supra note 11, at 56 (finding that parts of the Pakistan government,
especially members of the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) Directorate and Frontier Corps,
provide support to the Taliban in Pakistan); CRS Report, supra note 1, at 23; Anne Scott Tyson,
Border Complicates War in Afghanistan, WASH. POST, Apr. 4, 2008, at A1 (quoting a frontline
U.S. soldier as saying the “Frontier Corps might as well be Taliban. . . . They are active
facilitators of infiltration.”).
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issues such as control of the border areas, militant terrorist attacks within Pakistan, and militant
cross-border attacks into Afghanistan.26 As such, the strategy of the central Pakistani government
in handling the western border areas has oscillated between military action and negotiation.

The opaqueness of the relationship between the Pakistani Army, the Frontier Corps, and
the militants in FATA somewhat clouds the legal analysis that follows, since the cross-border
militant attacks on Afghanistan might or might not be viewed as attributable to the Pakistani
government, either due to that government’s outright collusion with the Taliban or its failure to
take the steps necessary to stop cross-border attacks. On the one hand, in some instances U.S.
intelligence officials, as well as independent researchers, have concluded that the Pakistani
government has provided direct support to militants for operations in Afghanistan, such as
logistical support for a militant car bombing at the Indian Embassy in Kabul in July 2008, a
charge denied by Pakistan.27 In light of those conclusions, it is no surprise that the Washington
Post reported CIA and U.S. military officials as saying that they “now withhold intelligence
about the suspected whereabouts of al-Qaeda commanders [in Pakistan] out of fear that the
Pakistanis might tip them off.”28

25

See Jones, supra note 11, at 21.
See CRS Report, supra note 1, at 27-28; Jones, supra note 11, at 57-58; Eric Schmitt &
Mark Mazzetti, Pakistan’s Planned Accord With Militants Alarms U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30,
2008, at A10; see also Ismail Khan & Carlotta Gall, Pakistan Lets Tribal Chiefs Keep Control
Along Border, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2006, at A8.
27
See Joby Warrick, U.S. Officials Pakistani Agents Helped Plan Kabul Bombing, WASH.
POST, Aug. 1, 2008, at A1; CRS Report, supra note 1, at 25; Jones, supra note 11, at 54-57.
28
See Craig Whitlock, In Hunt for Bin Laden, a New Approach, WASH. POST, Sept. 10,
2008, at A1.
26
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On the other hand, the Pakistani government’s general indifference to militant attacks
across the border into Afghanistan probably lies less in tacit support for those operations than in
a simple belief that pursuing large-scale military operations in FATA that kill Pashtuns, trample
prior agreements providing for FATA autonomy, and incur significant Pakistani army casualties
would be extremely unpopular with the Pakistani population and ultimately ineffective in
stopping cross-border attacks. Moreover, some Pakistani officials apparently wish to preserve the
possibility of a “Taliban option,” one that might prove useful for future relations in
Afghanistan.29 Whatever the reason, by mid-2008 the New York Times was reporting that
“Pakistani officials are making it increasingly clear that they have no interest in stopping crossborder attacks by militants into Afghanistan, prompting a new level of frustration from
Americans who see the infiltration as a crucial strategic priority in the war in Afghanistan.”30

C.

U.S. Cross-Border Operations into Pakistan

U.S. cross-border operations into Pakistan to date have taken three forms: missile strikes
from Predator drones; defensive actions in immediate response to a cross-border raid from
Afghanistan; and covert missions by special operations forces against militant targets located
deeper in Pakistan. Each should be considered separately when analyzing their legality under the
jus ad bellum.

29
30

A6.

See Nayak, supra note 3, at 305-06.
Jane Perlez, Pakistan Defies U.S. On Halting Attacks, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 2008, at
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First, the United States has engaged in attacks against what are believed to be Al Qaeda
and Taliban targets (such as training camps, compounds, or convoys) in Pakistan, using Hellfire
missiles launched from unmanned Predator aircraft. At least some of those aircraft are reportedly
kept at a secret base in Pakistan, not Afghanistan, such that these are not necessarily cross-border
operations.31 Further, the Pakistani government apparently has tacitly agreed that these strikes
may be undertaken without specific consent to each operation, so long as they target “foreign
fighters” and not Pakistani Taliban, though the existence of that tacit consent is disputed.32 While
the United States does not disclose its strikes, the Pakistani government asserted that three strikes
occurred in 2007 while eleven were conducted from January to August of 2008,33 with perhaps
another dozen or more in September and October.34 The strikes reportedly have had some
success, killing several senior Al Qaeda leaders.35 Yet they have also been blamed for the deaths
of dozens of civilians in Pakistan, collateral casualties that have fueled resentment among
Pakistanis toward the United States. If relations between the United States and Pakistan were to
deteriorate, and Predator aircraft were no longer allowed to be launched from within Pakistan,
then presumably such aircraft might be based in Afghanistan for the purpose of undertaking
missions cross-border into Pakistan.

31

See CRS Report, supra note 1, at 36; Joby Warrick & Robin Wright, Unilateral Strike
Called a Model for U.S. Operations in Pakistan, WASH. POST, Feb. 19, 2008, at A1.
32
See CRS Report, supra note 1, at 36; Robin Wright & Joby Warrick, U.S. Steps Up
Unilateral Strikes in Pakistan, WASH. POST, Mar. 27, 2008, at A1.
33
See Craig Whitlock, In Hunt for Bin Laden, a New Approach, WASH. POST, Sept. 10,
2008, at A1.
34
See Officials Report Airstrike, WASH. POST, Oct. 27, 2008, at A10.
35
See Saad Gul & Katherine M. Royal, Burning the Barn to Roast the Pig?
Proportionatlity Concerns in the War on Terror and the Damadola Incident, 14 WILLAMETTE J.
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Second, while U.S. military forces engaged in military operations in Afghanistan are
generally prohibited from crossing or firing into Afghanistan, their rules of engagement
apparently allow them to do so as a matter of “hot pursuit” when engaging in self-defense.36
Hence, when U.S. forces come under attack from militants (either by fire artillery fire from
Pakistan or by militant units who cross over the border from Pakistan), U.S. forces have
responded forcibly against the militants both in Afghanistan and through pursuit of the militants
back into Pakistan. For example, in June 2008, U.S. officials asserted that Taliban fighters from
Pakistan crossed over the border into Afghanistan (Kunar Province) and attacked U.S. led forces
with small caliber weapons and rocket propelled grenades. The U.S.-led forces returned fire,
drove the militants back across the border, and then pursued them with U.S. air force fighterbombers and a B-1 bomber, which dropped twelve gravity bombs on them. Though U.S. forces
apparently alerted Pakistani forces in advance about the intended air strike, Pakistani Frontier
Corps personnel were present at a border checkpoint and eleven were killed by the bombs (as
were several of the militants), resulting in a strong protest by the Pakistani government that the
U.S. operation was “a gross violation of the international border.”37

The determination that an attack from Pakistan against U.S. forces in Afghanistan has
occurred or is occurring has proven somewhat elastic. Hence, in at least one instance, when U.S.
INT’L L. & DISP. RESOL. 49, 51 (2006).
36
See, e.g., Reza Sayah, Pakistan fury over U.S. ‘hot pursuit’ act, CNN, June 11, 2008,
http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/asiapcf/06/11/pakistan.troops.killed/index.html .
37
See Carlotta Gall & Eric Schmitt, Pakistan Angry as Strike by U.S. Kills 11 Soldiers,
N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2008, at A1; CRS Report, supra note 1, at 34-35. In at least one instance,
Pakistani military forces may have fired warning shots to prevent U.S. troops from crossing the
border into Pakistan. See Candace Rondeaux, Pakistan Allegedly Repulses U.S. Raid, WASH.
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forces received information that militants were on the move in Pakistan and heading toward U.S.
forces in Afghanistan, U.S. forces preemptively attacked the militants even before they crossed
the border, including striking a compound one mile within Pakistan with missiles.38

Third, U.S. cross-border operations now apparently include covert missions by a U.S.
joint special operations forces task force (“JSOC,” likely consisting of Navy SEALs and the
Army’s Delta Force39) in pursuit of targets in Pakistan’s tribal areas—missions not undertaken in
immediate response to a cross-border raid from Pakistan. Such missions reportedly were planned
but not undertaken up until mid-2008, due to concerns about the likely success of such missions,
the effect on relations with the government of Pakistan, and the risks attendant to special forces
being killed or captured.40 In July 2008, however, President Bush reportedly issued secret orders
for such operations to occur even in the absence of express and prior Pakistani government
approval. According to the New York Times, which broke the story:

The new orders reflect concern about safe havens for Al Qaeda and the Taliban
inside Pakistan, as well as an American view that Pakistan lacks the will and ability to
combat militants. They also illustrate lingering distrust of the Pakistani military and
intelligence agencies and a belief that some American operations have been compromised

POST, Sept. 16, 2008, at A12.
38
See Ann Scott Tyson, Border Complicates War in Afghanistan, WASH. POST, Apr. 4,
2008, at A1.
39
See Sean D. Naylor, Spec Ops Raids Into Pakistan Halted, NAVY TIMES, Sept. 29,
2008.
40
See Craig Whitlock, In Hunt for Bin Laden, a New Approach, WASH. POST, Sept. 10,
2008, at A1.
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once Pakistanis were advised of the details.41

On September 3, 2008, the first operation occurred, involving U.S. Navy SEALs crossing the
border on helicopters, supported by an AC-130 gunship, landing in Angor Adda (in the South
Waziristan tribal agency), killing about two dozen suspected Al Qaeda fighters, and then
returning to Afghanistan by helicopter.42 Pakistani authorities strongly objected to the operation
and threatened, if such attacks continued, to cut off U.S. supply lines through Pakistan to U.S.
forces in land-locked Afghanistan.43

III.

Potential Legal Bases for U.S. Cross-Border Operations

Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter provides that: “All members shall refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United
Nations.”44 The three forms of cross-border (or, with respect to drone aircraft, potentially crossborder) operations noted in the prior section would likely be regarded as violations of Article
2(4) in the absence of some form of justification, for they entail military personnel or weapons
41

See Eric Schmitt & Mark Mazzetti, Bush Said to Give Orders Allowing Raids in
Pakistan, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2008, at A1.
42
Id.; Craig Whitlock, In Hunt for Bin Laden, a New Approach, WASH. POST, Sept. 10,
2008, at A1 (reporting that “U.S. commandos crossed from Afghanistan into Pakistan in
helicopters and killed about 20 people in a suspected Taliban compound in South Waziristan.”).
The rules of engagement for special operations forces operating in Afghanistan are classified.
43
See Naylor, supra note 39 (quoting an unnamed U.S. government official that the raid
was a “strategic miscalculation”).
44
U.N. Charter art. 2(4).
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entering Pakistani territory and inflicting considerable violence upon persons present in Pakistan
and their property. There are, however, four potential bases for justifying these cross-border
operations under international law: (A) consent by the Pakistani government; (B) authorization
by the U.N. Security Council; (C) inherent self-defense against non-state actors operating from
Pakistan; or (D) inherent self-defense against Pakistan itself. Each justification is briefly
discussed in turn.

A.

U.S. Cross-Border Action Taken with the Consent of Pakistan

To the extent that the government of Pakistan has consented to U.S. cross-border military
operations from Afghanistan into Pakistan, that consent obviates any question about the legality
of those operations under international law. Standard rules on state responsibility accept that
conduct does not violate an obligation to a state if that state has consented to the conduct,45 and
that view applies in the area of the jus ad bellum as well.46 While the legal justification for U.S.
cross-border operations appears heavily reliant on Pakistani consent, the existence of such
consent to the three forms of U.S. cross-border operations discussed above is not at all clear or
may not prove enduring.
45

See, e.g., International Law Commission, Articles on Responsibility of States for
Internationally Wrongful Acts, art. 20, in Report of the International Law Commission, Fiftythird Session, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001) (“Valid consent by a State to the commission of a given
act by another State precludes the wrongfulness of that act in relation to the former State to the
extent that the act remains within the limits of that consent.”)
46
See, e.g., Oscar Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 MICH. L. REV.
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Media reports, largely based on off-the-record comments by senior U.S. and Pakistani
officials, indicate that Pakistan’s civilian and military leadership are not prepared publicly to
support U.S. cross-border operations into Pakistan.47 Yet that lack of public consent does not
mean that Pakistani consent does not exist. Surveying the background to U.S. cross-border
operations, the Washington Post has noted that although Pakistan “formally protests such actions
as a violation of its sovereignty, the Pakistani government has generally looked the other way
when the CIA conducted Predator missions or U.S. troops respond to cross-border attacks by the
Taliban.”48 There may be internal documents or communications from the Pakistani government
that clarify such consent and, if so, the United States will be in a strong position to establish the
legality of these operations in whatever venue is necessary, assuming such information can be
made public. Certainly the Pakistani government’s knowledge of Predator drones being based in
Pakistan, and its knowledge that such aircraft are being used for missile strikes, presents a strong
picture of tacit consent so long as such knowledge can be established. However, if the Pakistani
government’s consent is based solely on a belief that the Pakistani government is “looking the
other way,” then establishing consent may be difficult in the face of the various public protests
about U.S. cross-border actions that have been made by Pakistan.
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With respect to the more recent special operations missions, the New York Times reported
that a “senior American official said that the Pakistani government had privately assented to the
general concept of limited ground assaults by Special Operations forces against significant
military targets, but that it did not approve each mission.”49 Yet the public stance of the Pakistani
government is that such operations are not permitted.50 In the wake of the September 3, 2008,
cross-border operation by U.S. Navy SEALs, and the adverse reaction of Pakistani army and
public opinion to such raids, the Chief of the Pakistani Army, General Ashfaq Parvez, asserted:
“There is no question of any agreement or understanding with the coalition forces whereby they
are allowed to conduct operations on our side of the border.”51

Confusion about the existence of consent stems in part from the fractured nature of the
Pakistani government.52 The President of Pakistan, Asif Ali Zardari, is the official head of state,
while Prime Minister Syed Yousaf Raza Gillani is the head of government. The President and his
designees would normally be looked to for Pakistani consent to the use of force by another state
in Pakistan. Under Pakistani law, the President appoints the Chief of the Army Staff, currently
General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, an individual that might be seen as deputized to provide consent
on behalf of the President. Yet, at present, there is a considerable divide in views between
President Zardari and the Army leadership, including over Pakistani consent to U.S. cross-border
49
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operations.53 The Army’s disagreements with the civilian leadership are not simply bureaucratic
maneuvers; on several occasions the army has overthrown the President and Prime Minister,
most recently in October 1999 when the army deposed the elected Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif,
in a bloodless coup.54 Moreover, as indicated above, with the “Talibanization” of the western
region, Pakistani sovereign power in the FATA is almost de minimis, suggesting a nascent
insurgency that already contests Islamabad’s authority in the west and that may ultimately
contest it nationwide. Depending on how Pakistani politics unfold, discerning consent solely
from the President may or may not reflect the true source of sovereign power in Pakistan.

Even if sovereign consent may be discerned, there are disadvantages to the United States
in basing the jus ad bellum legality of its operations solely on the consent of the Pakistani
government. That consent, whether given explicitly or implicitly, may be withdrawn at any time,
unless it is expressed as a legally binding commitment for a specified period of time. With the
changes in leadership within Pakistan in recent years, consent from the government cannot be
relied upon as steadfast. Moreover, consent may always be predicated on certain requirements,
such as prior notification of a given action to the Pakistan, which may be difficult for timesensitive operations or where concerns exist about maintaining confidentiality. Since the host
government’s consent only establishes the legality of action taken within the scope of the
consent, the any U.S. operations taken outside that scope will implicate Article 2(4). For
example, if it is true that Predator drone strikes are only authorized for attacks against Al Qaeda
53
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or foreign fighters, then pursuit of such strikes against Taliban could be regarded as a violation
of the jus ad bellum.

Finally, while consent is a valid justification when it is received from a de jure
government fully in control of its territory, it might become invalid if that government no longer
controls or only partially controls its territory. Traditional jus ad bellum doctrine regards support
for a government as permissible until such point as an internal insurgency has risen to the level
of being a co-belligerent with the government, at which point arguably the government is no
longer “in a position to invite assistance in the name of the state.”55 If the apparent
“Talibanization” of the western provinces of Pakistan continues apace, and spreads throughout
Pakistan, at some point the ability of the de jure government to consent to U.S. cross-border
operations under international law may be regarded in the international community as
insufficient to support the legality of those operations.56

In short, consent of the Pakistani government is a strong legal justification for the use of
U.S. Predator aircraft in Pakistan, so long as Pakistan continues to allow them to be launched
55
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By way of example, some states expressed concern about Ethiopia’s intervention in
Somalia in 2006 for the purpose of suppressing the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC). While the
intervention was conducted the request of the Somali Transitional Government, which had been
established with the backing of the United Nations, the African Union, and the Arab League, the
transitional government controlled only a small portion of southern Somalia at the time of the
intervention, while the UIC controlled the Somali capital and much of the rest of the country. “In
such a fragile situation and in a crisis mainly of an internal nature, military intervention by
invitation may be very controversial indeed . . . .” Zeray W. Yihdego, Ethiopia’s Military Action
Against the Union of Islamic Courts and Others in Somalia: Some Legal Implications, 56 INT’L
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from a Pakistani base. U.S. cross-border operations, however, can only rely upon this
justification if authoritative decision-makers in Pakistan have formally consented to the type of
operation at issue, and so long as that consent remains intact. The facts publicly available suggest
Pakistani tolerance of, but not necessarily formal consent to, U.S. cross-border operations
undertaken in immediate response to attacks by militants staged from Pakistan. Even for these
operations, Pakistan appears to expect notification and avoidance of actions that could harm
Pakistani forces or civilians. By contrast, Pakistan publicly appears to have rejected cross-border
operations by U.S. special forces undertaken deeper in Pakistani territory and not in response to
an immediate raid from Pakistan. Overall, given the potential difficulty in proving the existence
Pakistani consent to U.S. cross-border operations, and the possibility of such consent ending,
other justifications for U.S. cross-border operations should be considered as well.

B.

U.S. Cross-Border Action Authorized by the U.N. Security Council

Assuming that Pakistani government consent cannot be found in support of all or some of
U.S. cross-border operations, an alternative basis for legality might be pursued in the form of
Security Council authorization. When acting under U.N. Charter Chapter VII, the Security
Council is empowered to decide upon measures necessary for maintaining or restoring peace and
security, including measures that are forcible in nature.57 The Security Council has adopted
several resolutions relating to Afghanistan in the aftermath of the attacks of 9/11, but none of
those resolutions appears to authorize U.S. cross-border operations into Pakistan.
COMP. L.Q. 666 (2008).
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Prior to the overthrow of the de facto Afghan government of the Taliban, the Security
Council adopted two resolutions that affirmed, in the context of the 9/11 attacks, the inherent
right of individual and collective self-defense and the need “to combat by all means” the “threats
to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts.”58 These resolutions did not constitute
a Chapter VII authorization from the Security Council to use force; rather, they were a
confirmation of an inherent right of self-defense that preceded and was preserved through
passage of the resolutions.59 The next sub-section considers whether U.S. cross-border operations
into Pakistan can be justified on the basis of individual or collective self-defense.

After the de facto Taliban government was overthrown in late 2001, the United Nations
facilitated negotiations in Bonn, Germany to establish a framework and timeline for the
establishment of new Afghan political institutions. Moreover, Annex 1 of the Bonn Agreement
provided that “the participants request the assistance of the international community in helping
the new Afghan authorities in the establishment and training of new Afghan security and armed
forces,” and requested “the early deployment to Afghanistan of a United Nations mandated
force.”60 In Resolution 1386, the Security Council endorsed the Bonn Agreement and authorized
57
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the establishment of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) “to assist the Afghan
Interim Authority in the maintenance of security in Kabul and its surrounding areas, so that the
Afghan Interim Authority as well as the personnel of the United Nations can operate in a secure
environment.”61 The resolution also called upon “Member States participating in the
International Security Assistance Force to provide assistance to help the Afghan Interim
Authority in the establishment and training of new Afghan security and armed forces.”62 Shortly
thereafter, the interim Afghan government concluded a bilateral agreement with ISAF
concerning the size of the deployment and the tasks it would undertake.63 In 2002, the Security
Council adopted Resolution 1413, authorizing “Member States participating in the International
Security Assistance Force to take all necessary measures to fulfill the mandate of the
International Security Assistance Force.”64 Subsequent resolutions have extended ISAF’s
mandate temporally65 and geographically, such as allowing ISAF:

to support the Afghan Transitional Authority and its successors in the maintenance of
security in areas of Afghanistan outside of Kabul and its environs, so that the Afghan

S/2001/1154 (2001).
61
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Authorities as well as the personnel of the United Nations and other international civilian
personnel engaged, in particular, in reconstruction and humanitarian efforts, can operate
in a secure environment, and to provide security assistance for the performance of other
tasks in support of the Bonn Agreement.66

From these instruments, it is apparent that ISAF is a multinational security force
authorized by the U.N. Security Council under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. ISAF is not a
U.N. force in the sense of being funded by, and under the command-and-control of, the United
Nations; rather, it is a coalition of self-funding states authorized by the Security Council to
engage in specified tasks in Afghanistan. Though the Security Council theoretically could
authorize ISAF to engage in cross-border operations into Pakistan, no such authorization exists
in any of the Security Council resolutions either expressly or by implication. Indeed, while ISAF
sees its mission as including efforts to defeat the threat of insurgency in Afghanistan, NATO’s
2005 Operational Plan, as revised, provides that ISAF’s mission is the stabilization of
Afghanistan, not counter-terrorism.67

U.S. cross-border operations are not undertaken through ISAF. Rather, such operations
occur as a part of the multi-national coalition of states present in Afghanistan for Operation
Enduring Freedom (OEF). U.S. forces in Afghanistan for OEF are deployed as the Combined
66
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Joint Task Force-82 (CJTF-82), which is based in Bagram Air Base. That task force reports to
the U.S.-led Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan (CFC-A), which is based in Kabul. The
CJTF-82 operates and supervises a Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-Afghanistan
(CJSOTF-A), which consists of special operations forces. Yet there is also reportedly an “Other
Coalition Forces” (OCF) unit of special operations forces, which does not report to CJTF-82.
This latter, more secretive unit may be the one responsible for the covert U.S. cross-border
missions into Pakistan.

In any event, all of these U.S. forces deployed for OEF are separate from the U.S. forces
deployed in support of the U.N.-mandated and NATO-led ISAF which, as discussed above, is
focused on providing security in Kabul and its surrounding areas for the Afghan government,
and assisting the government in the establishment and training of Afghan security and armed
forces. ISAF and OEF have completely separate mandates and missions, with ISAF focusing on
a stabilization and security mission, while OEF focuses on the counter-terrorism mission. None
of the Security Council resolutions discussed above relate to OEF and hence cannot serve as a
basis for a Security Council mandate for the United States to engage in cross-border operations
into Pakistan.

C.

U.S. Cross-Border Action Taken in Self-Defense against Non-State Actors

A third basis for maintaining that U.S. cross-border operations into Pakistan are
permissible under the jus ad bellum relies upon the United States’ inherent right of self-defense

28
or its right to engage in collective self-defense at the request of Afghanistan. Article 51 of the
U.N. Charter indicates that the prohibition on the use of force embedded in Article 2(4) may be
justified when acting in self-defense, since: “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the
inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member
of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain
international peace and security.”68

In considering this basis, there are several key and perhaps troubling questions that arise:
What was the preceding use of force against which the United States is defending? Does that
preceding use of force rise to the level of an “armed attack” within the meaning of U.N. Charter
Article 51? Can the United States invoke Article 51 when defending against the conduct of a
non-state actor? Are the U.S. cross-border actions necessary and proportionate defensive
responses? Each question is discussed in turn.

What was the preceding use of force against which the United States is defending? There
are two candidates for the preceding uses of force to which the United States is responding in
self-defense. First, the United States might be seen as today still defending against Al Qaeda’s
attacks of 9/11 (as well as perhaps other actions taken by Al Qaeda globally against the United
States, such as the 1998 bombing of U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya and the 2000 attack
on the USS Cole in Yemen). If the initial U.S. invasion of Afghanistan was a permissible act of
self-defense against the perpetrators of 9/11, one designed to diminish or destroy Al Qaeda’s
68
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network, then cross-border operations today might be seen as part of a continuous process to
accomplish that objective, albeit years later. There has been no temporal interruption in the
deployment of U.S. forces for this purpose, nor has there been a geographic interruption given
that Al Qaeda elements fled toward and across the Pakistani border.

One complicating factor, however, arises from the use of cross-border operations to
diminish or destroy the Taliban instead of Al Qaeda. Even at the time of 9/11, there were some
doubts expressed about the right of the United States to defend against the 9/11 attacks by using
force for the purpose of ousting and destroying the Taliban.69 While selective attacks on the
Taliban that were necessary to defend U.S. forces hunting down Al Qaeda elements post-9/11
were squarely within the notion of self-defending against Al Qaeda’s 9/11 attacks, operations
directed solely against the Taliban were seen as more problematic, since the Taliban was not
directly involved in the 9/11 attacks, in the sense of planning, funding, sending persons, or
otherwise sponsoring those attacks.

An alternative preceding act triggering a right of U.S. self-defense are the more recent
cross-border raids into Afghanistan by militants based in Pakistan (mostly Taliban, but with
support from Al Qaeda and other foreign fighters) to strike at U.S. or coalition forces, or the
government of Afghanistan. This approach does not emphasize the attacks of 9/11 but, rather, the
contemporary cross-border operations that are harming coalition and Afghan interests in
Afghanistan. So long as Afghanistan has consented to the presence of U.S. forces as a means of
69
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assisting Afghanistan in defending against such attacks, U.S. actions fall within the scope of
either individual or collective self-defense, though they should be notified to the U.N. Security
Council in accordance with U.N. Charter Article 51. Afghan President Hamid Karzai himself has
asserted Afghanistan’s right to defend itself from such attacks by crossing the border into
Pakistan and destroying “terrorist nests.”70 Here, though, the complicating factor is the converse
of that noted above; to the extent that the Taliban are principally responsible for such crossborder operations, then it is their conduct that may be seen as triggering a right of self-defense
and it is their conduct against which defensive measures may be taken. Only to the extent that Al
Qaeda is engaged in the cross-border attacks into Afghanistan can U.S. defensive responses
against those attacks target Al Qaeda elements.

The upshot is that the preceding acts at issue may be a hybrid. U.S. cross border actions
against Al Qaeda in the form of covert special forces missions (as well as Predator attacks when
launched from Afghanistan) are probably best viewed as a continuing defensive response to the
attacks of 9/11, whereas actions against Taliban and other militants infiltrating Afghanistan are
best viewed as a defensive response against attacks occurring today on coalition forces in
Afghanistan, as well as the Afghan government.

Do those preceding uses of force rise to the level of an “armed attack” within the
meaning of U.N. Charter Article 51? Article 51, by its terms, preserves a pre-existing right of
self defense “if an armed attack occurs.” Scholars and states differ over whether such language
and Beyond, 35 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 533, 540-43 (2002).
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necessarily requires that an “armed attack” occur before the resort to self-defense,71 but
governments typically argue that such an attack has occurred whenever they resort to selfdefense.72 As such, a key question is whether the preceding actions that justify U.S. cross-border
operations rise to the level of being an “armed attack” within the meaning of Article 51. In the
case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v.
United States of America), the International Court of Justice provided some guidance on this
point. On the one hand, a state’s deployment of regular armed forces across a border, or the
sending by a state of “armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries which carry out acts of
armed force,” can constitute an armed attack; on the other hand, a state’s “assistance to rebels in
the form of the provision of weapons or logistical or other support” does not constitute an armed
attack.73 Hence, there is a sliding scale by which one assesses the level of intrusiveness and
gravity of the act at issue to determine whether it rises to a level of “armed attack” that triggers a
right of self-defense under Article 51.

With respect to the preceding act of Al Qaeda’s conduct on 9/11, there should be little
doubt that such coercion constitutes an “armed attack,” given the scale of destruction and loss of
70
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life that occurred, as well as the reactions of the United States and relevant international
organizations, all of which characterized the conduct as attacks triggering a right of selfdefense.74

With respect to the preceding act of Taliban cross-border operations into Afghanistan, the
gravity of those actions to date are of a much different character, in terms of the loss of life and
destruction. Nevertheless, as indicated previously, the attacks are occurring at a rate of from
twenty a month in March 2007 to fifty-three a month in April 2008, causing considerable injury
and deaths to Afghans and the coalition forces that are in Afghanistan with Afghan consent.
While any given cross-border raid into Afghanistan by militants from Pakistan might be said to
fall below the threshold of an armed attack, and instead constitute merely a “frontier incident,”75
the cumulative effect of all these cross-border attacks by militants would likely be seen as
constituting an “armed attack” within the meaning of Article 51.

Can the United States invoke Article 51 when defending against the conduct of a nonstate actor? Article 2(4) prohibits uses of force by one state against another state. Article 51 is
less clear in speaking solely to conduct between two states, since its language simply speaks of a
U.N. member’s self-defense against an armed attack, without indicating whether it is a state that
must be undertaking that attack. Even so, it might be argued that the Charter was designed solely
to speak to rights and obligations as between states, and any act of self-defense must be in
74
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response to an armed attack committed by or attributable to another state.76 In the Military and
Paramilitary Activities case, the International Court of Justice regarded attribution of non-state
actor conduct to a state as the critical factor when weighing the permissibility of defensive action
against that state, but did not directly address the issue of defensive action against the non-state
actor itself.77 However, in the Advisory Opinion on the Israeli Wall, the Court—without much
analysis—rejected Israel’s claim that it was acting in self-defense against attacks by terrorist
groups. The Court opined that Israel could not be acting in self-defense under Article 51 because
(1) Israel had not claimed that the terrorist attacks at issue were imputable to a foreign state and
(2) those attacks were not transnational in nature, having occurred wholly within territory
occupied by Israel.78

If the advisory opinion is correctly interpreting the jus ad bellum, then it may not be
possible to engage in Article 51 self-defense against a non-state actor; rather, self-defense is
reserved for actions against another state, perhaps in situations where the acts of the non-state
actor have been imputed to that other state. The Court’s opinion, however, has been subjected to
considerable criticism, much of which notes the fact that the global community (including the
Security Council, NATO, and the OAS) appears to have regarded the attacks by Al Qaeda of
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9/11 as justifying a response in self-defense.79 Such criticisms may explain a possible retreat by
the Court in its 2005 case concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo. In that
case, rather than repeat its legal position from the advisory opinion, the Court stated that, given
the facts at issue in the case, there was “no need to respond to the contentions of the Parties as to
whether and under what conditions contemporary international law provides for a right of selfdefense against large-scale attacks by irregular forces.”80 Both Judges Kooijmans and Simma
stated in separate opinions that, if the Court still views Article 51 as restricted to self-defense
only against an attack by another state, then the Court is out-of-step with both the Security
Council and state practice.81

While this area of the law remains somewhat uncertain, the dominant trend in
contemporary interstate relations seems to favor the view that states accept or at least tolerate
acts of self-defense against a non-state actor. Turkey has engaged in various cross-border
operations against the Kurdish separatist guerilla organization known as the Kurdistan Workers’
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Party (or PKK),82 without being condemned by the Security Council, General Assembly, or
International Court. In early 2008, Colombian military forces bombed and crossed into Ecuador
to attack guerrillas of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), which is regarded
by Colombia as a terrorist and drug-trafficking organization. Again, none of the principal organs
of the United Nations criticized the action; while the Organization of American States adopted a
resolution declaring the Colombian raid to be a violation of Ecuador’s sovereignty, the OAS
stopped short of expressly condemning Colombia.83 Israel in the summer of 2006 sent military
forces into, and bombed portions of, southern Lebanon in an effort to strike at the Hezbollah
movement, which has operated out of Lebanon to attack and kill Israeli nationals.84 Similarly, in
early 2008, Israel launched a major military ground operation, as well as air strikes, against
Hamas fighters in the Gaza Strip.85 In neither instance did the principal U.N. organs declare the
conduct unlawful self-defense. The United States undertook an air strike inside Syria in October
2008 reportedly to stem the flow of foreign fighters and weapons from that country into Iraq.86
As is the case for most customary law on the jus ad bellum norms, it is not possible to
demonstrate through widespread and systematic state practice that the concept of self-defense
82
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embraces action against non-state actors, but the better view appears to be that it does.

Are the U.S. cross-border actions necessary and proportionate defensive responses?
Although Article 51 of the U.N. Charter does not expressly require that self-defense be
undertaken only as necessary and proportionate to the threat faced, those constraints present in
customary international law on the use of force have been deemed applicable to the post-Charter
jus ad bellum. As the International Court of Justice has stated:

The submission of the exercise of the right of self-defence to the conditions of
necessity and proportionality is a rule of customary international law. As the Court stated
in the case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua
(Nicaragua v. United States of America), there is a “specific rule whereby self-defence
would warrant only measures which are proportional to the armed attack and necessary to
respond to it, a rule well established in customary international law” (I.C.J. Reports 1986,
p. 94, para. 176). This dual condition applies equally to Article 51 of the Charter,
whatever the means of force employed.87

In considering whether force is “necessary,” the International Court of Justice and
scholars typically first consider whether there are peaceful alternatives to self-defense, such as
pursuing available diplomatic avenues.88 This might entail determining whether the attacker has
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been asked to desist from further attacks and to make reparation for injuries it has caused.
Assuming that no reasonable alternative means exist, the concept of “necessity” focuses on the
nature of the target pursued by the defender; where the target is the source (or one of the sources)
of the threat to the defender, it is considered necessary defense to attack that target. “Necessity”
does not require a defender to limit itself to actions that merely repel an initial attack; a state may
use force in self-defense to remove a continuing threat to future security,89 such as pursuing
action against Japan in the 1940s until its militarist regime has capitulated. An example of a lack
of necessity may be seen in the International Court of Justice’s Oil Platforms case, where the
Court found that the United States did not complain to Iran about the military activities allegedly
undertaken from the platforms, nor proved that the platforms were the source of the threat to the
United States in the Gulf such that attacking them was necessary for eliminating that threat.90

“Proportionality” does not require that the force be a mirror image of the initial attack,
nor that the defensive actions be restricted to the particular geographic location in which the
initial attack occurred. Rather than focus on the form, substance, or strength of the initial attack,
proportionality calls for assessing the result sought for eliminating that threat and the means
being used to achieve that result.91 As suggested by Professor Roberto Ago, a rapporteur for the
International Law Commission on the rules of state responsibility and later judge on the
89
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International Court of Justice, “in the case of action taken for the specific purpose of halting and
repelling an armed attack, this does not mean that the action should be more or less
commensurate with the attack. Its lawfulness cannot be measured except by its capacity for
achieving the desired result.”92 Such reasoning is reflected in the national military manuals
adopted by many states; for instance, the U.S. Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval
Operations indicates that proportionality imposes a “requirement that the use of force be in all
circumstances limited in intensity, duration and scope to that which is reasonably required to
counter the attack or threat of attack and to ensure the continued safety of U.S. forces . . . .”93

In the Oil Platforms case, the International Court signaled that, if it were proved that a
shore-based missile had been launched by Iran against a U.S. flag vessel, a proportionate
defensive response could include destroying an Iranian oil platform elsewhere in the Gulf, so
long as the platform was shown to be engaged in assisting attacks on U.S. vessels in the Gulf. In
other words, the Court found that a proportionate defensive response to a missile attack on a
vessel was not limited to infliction of a missile attack in response, nor limited to the targeting of
the facility from which the missile was launched. At the same time, the Court stated that, in a
situation where the attack consists of the single mining of a ship (which was damaged but not
sunk), a defensive response that destroys numerous vessels and aircraft of the attacker, as well as
oil platforms, is disproportionate in scale to the threat.94 While one might argue about the Court’s
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treatment of the facts in that case, the thrust of the Court’s dicta was to consider the nature of the
threat being faced by the defender and whether the defensive conduct, by its nature and scale,
was designed to eliminate that threat. Similarly, in Armed Activities on the Territory of the
Congo, the Court indicated that the armed “taking of airports and towns many hundreds of
kilometers from [the defending state’s] border would not seem proportionate to the series of
transborder attacks it claimed had given rise to the right of self-defence, nor to be necessary to
that end.”95

In considering the necessity and proportionality of U.S. cross-border operations against
Pakistan, it is important to focus on the two preceding threats that appear to have prompted those
operations: the attacks of 9/11 and the more recent cross-border attacks from Pakistan into
Afghanistan.

First, the Al Qaeda attacks of 9/11 serve as a preceding “armed attack” against the United
States triggering a right of self-defense in the form of operations designed to remove the threat of
Al Qaeda. Given that for years the United States had demanded that Al Qaeda desist from its
activities and had sought extradition of Bin Laden and his lieutenants from Afghanistan, and
given that the 9/11 attacks were attributable to planning, training and funding emanating from
Afghanistan,96 the defensive response taken against Al Qaeda personnel and camps in
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Afghanistan is properly regarded as both necessary and proportionate.97

Yet most international observers or courts would likely find that the same is not true with
respect to the ability of the United States to pursue defensive actions against Al Qaeda across a
national boundary into Pakistan or any other country. Here the use of force in self-defense in
response to the attacks of 9/11 would likely be seen as both unnecessary and disproportionate,
principally because Pakistan is a third country that in no sense harbored Al Qaeda elements at the
time of 9/11. Such use of force is unnecessary given Pakistan’s stated willingness to ally itself
with the United States in its counter-terrorism efforts to strike at Al Qaeda. The United States no
doubt disagrees and distrusts aspects of Pakistani policy on how best to engage in counterterrorism; yet those disagreements alone do not provide the legal justification for the United
States to engage in unilateral uses of force in Pakistan. While working in conjunction with the
Pakistani government is no doubt a difficult diplomatic challenge, most observers would likely
say that it is an available avenue that makes the unilateral resort to force unnecessary.98

For similar reasons, the unilateral use of force to strike at Al Qaeda in Pakistan in
response to the 9/11 attacks would be found disproportionate, in that the spatial and temporal
97
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displacement of the threat of Al Qaeda to a different country introduces important competing
values, to wit the territorial integrity and political independence of a country that did not
knowingly support, sponsor, or tolerate Al Qaeda in the years preceding 9/11. The violence that
invariably accompanies unilateral uses of force, even those taken in self-defense, intrudes
severely into the values of peace and stability to which Pakistan is entitled under the jus ad
bellum, and does so without justification when the targeted state bears no responsibility for the
initial armed attack against which defensive action is being deployed.99 Certainly if Osama Bin
Laden were to turn up in a country such as Bulgaria or Tunisia, that circumstance would
introduce multiple new variables for any proportionality analysis, such that the United States
could not rely on the same analysis that justified intervening in Afghanistan in 2001. The same
holds true for Pakistan, notwithstanding its existence as a neighbor to Afghanistan.

A final consideration is that, arguably, the threat to the United States from Al Qaeda itself
has changed since 9/11; the Al Qaeda now in Pakistan is a considerably reduced and weakened
entity, one forced to hide out in the hills, with difficulty in sustaining the same infrastructure it
operated in Afghanistan. Some observers see Al Qaeda as having mutated into an almost
headless hydra, such that the real threat of attacks to the United States now largely lies in
numerous cells located worldwide.100 If so, then the elements of Al Qaeda present in
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Afghanistan, including Osama Bin Laden, remain dangerous, but may not be seen as
operationally threatening the United States in the same manner as they did in 2001. As such, the
defensive action that may be taken against those elements, in order to be proportionate, could be
viewed as of a lesser magnitude than what was regarded as permissible in the immediate
aftermath of 9/11. Not all analysts, however, see the threat of Al Qaeda as having changed so
significantly since 9/11. While there may be “a low-level probability that al Qaeda will be able to
attack the U.S. in the next five years,” Al Qaeda even based along the Afghan-Pakistan border is
still able to train personnel for and direct attacks abroad, such as the July 2005 London
bombings, the foiled August 2006 plot in the United Kingdom to blow up U.S. airliners with
liquid explosives, and Al Qaeda attacks in Iraq.101

Could circumstances change in Pakistan that might generate a consensus favorable to the
unilateral resort to armed force in Pakistan against Al Qaeda because the latter represents a broad
threat to U.S. national security? Certainly if the same circumstances arose as existed at the time
of 9/11—with a radical Islamic government in Islamabad, one hostile to the United States and
with close connections to Al Qaeda, resulting in a major Al Qaeda attack on the United States—
then the unilateral use of force in self-defense against Al Qaeda in Pakistan would likely be seen
as justified, just as it was in Afghanistan in 2001. A more difficult question might be whether
such force would be justified in the period prior to Al Qaeda in Pakistan’s attack on the United
States, perhaps due to highly credible information concerning an imminent attack. At present,
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however, Pakistan simply is not like Afghanistan under the Taliban in 2001, and it is hoped that
with proper support from the United States and other allies, and avoidance of tactics that fuel
militancy, Pakistan will not descend to that level.

The second type of preceding armed attack are the cross-border raids by militants from
Pakistan, principally Taliban but with support from Al Qaeda, against U.S. and coalition forces
and the Afghan government in Afghanistan. Here the jus ad bellum requirements of necessity
and proportionality do not lend themselves to broad conclusions, but do provide guidance for
analyzing confrontations as their arise along the border. For example, the necessity of U.S. forces
reacting to incursions by militants from Afghanistan will turn in part on whether the United
States has pursued and continues to pursue all avenues possible to obtain Pakistani government
support for preventing such incursions. Responses by U.S. forces to militant incursions will be
regarded as necessary if it is evident that Pakistani authorities are unwilling or unable to stem
such incursions from their territory. Further, responses by U.S. forces that react to an actual raid
by militants into Afghanistan likely will be regarded as more necessary than those that act to
interdict anticipated incursions, given that there is always uncertainly as to whether the
anticipated event will actually occur. Responses by U.S. forces that react to incursions by
directly and immediately targeting those militants, using force of a comparable nature and scale,
likely will be regarded as more proportionate than responses that target other militants in other
places and times, using force of considerably greater magnitude, though even the latter can be
proportionate if designed to remove the overall threat of cross-border incursions from Pakistan.
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A perhaps harder question concerns the necessity and proportionality of striking at Al
Qaeda officials, camps, or convoys as a response to Al Qaeda’s support for militant crossborder raids into Afghanistan. Such attacks are more removed temporally and spatially from the
cross-border raids by militants. Yet if Al Qaeda is providing training and other support for such
raids, and in some instances even commanding them, then most observers would likely regard it
as proportionate to the threat posed to respond by attacking persons and entities behind-the-lines
directly associated with the raids. The facts of Al Qaeda’s association with these cross-border
raids would have to be well-understood and the acts of self-defense by the United States against
Al Qaeda, in order to be proportionate, would need to be designed to prevent that association. As
for whether such actions are necessary, they are not necessary in the sense of providing
immediate defense to U.S. forces in Afghanistan who are under attack, but they are necessary if
it can be shown that, in the absence of such actions, the cross-border raids from Pakistan will not
stop.

The distinction drawn here may seem meaningless, if it allows the United States to strike
at Al Qaeda not for purposes of responding to 9/11, but instead for purposes of responding to Al
Qaeda’s association with cross-border raids into Afghanistan. Yet the point is that while jus ad
bellum requirements of proportionality and necessity do not preclude U.S. cross-border
operations in response to raids by militants from Pakistan, nor from attacking Al Qaeda elements
in support of those raids, those requirements will likely be regarded as conditioning the manner
in which the U.S. operations may be conducted. Rather than testing the necessity and
proportionality of U.S. operations as against the threat posed by Al Qaeda from its attacks of
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9/11, they must be tested against the threat posed by Al Qaeda in its association with the crossborder raids, which depending on the facts can lead to considerable differences in the scope and
intensity of U.S. measures that may be undertaken.

D.

U.S. Cross-Border Action Taken in Self-Defense against Pakistan

At present, the United States has not regarded Pakistan itself as posing a threat to the
security of the United States, but this may change in the future. As discussed above, while the
Pakistani government’s relationship with militant actors in the western part of Taliban is obscure,
it is reasonably clear that Pakistan’s interests and objectives are not fully synchronized with
those of the United States. Though Pakistani officials seem to have no particular sympathy for Al
Qaeda, the same is not uniformly true with respect to Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan. Over time,
Pakistan’s tolerance if not support for Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, may lead to some level of
indirect support for Al Qaeda, which would place Pakistan at considerable odds with U.S.
interests.

The jus ad bellum disfavors action taken in self-defense against a government that is
simply associated with a malfeasant non-state actor. The lesson of the Nicaragua case is that
when a state simply harbors or even funds a bad actor, and that bad actor engages in an act of
extreme violence against another state, the first state is not viewed as itself having committed an
armed attack against the attacked state. Rules of state responsibility on the attribution of conduct
to a state would require the host state itself to order the bad actor to engage in the violent
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conduct, to empower the bad actor to act on the state’s behalf, to endorse the violent conduct, or
perhaps to fail to prevent the violent conduct knowing that it was about to happen and having the
means to prevent it.102 As such, imputing the armed attacks of Al Qaeda or of the Taliban into
armed attacks of Pakistan at present would be a significant leap, at least in the absence of far
greater connections between the Pakistani government and those militants than is presently
understood to exist.

III.

Conclusion

To date, U.S. cross-border operations from Afghanistan into Pakistan have taken three
forms: the use of Predator drones to target Al Qaeda fighters (although such drones may be
launched solely from within Pakistan); the “hot pursuit” of militants who engaged in raids from
Pakistan against U.S. and allied forces in Afghanistan, as well as the Afghan government; and
the deployment of special operations forces into Pakistan as a means of striking at Al Qaeda.

These types of cross-border operations clearly implicate the jus ad bellum, in that they
entail one state projecting highly coercive military force into another state. Arguably Pakistan
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has consented to at least some of these types of cross-border operations, but that consent is
poorly documented, suffers from the conflicting and diffuse sources of authority within the
Pakistani government, and ultimately may not endure given the vicissitudes of Pakistani
domestic politics. As such, though consent is a powerful and useful basis for supporting the
legality of U.S. cross-border operations, other justifications should be considered as well.

Assuming Pakistani consent is lacking, other justifications for U.S. cross-border
operations must be considered. The U.N. Security Council has on several occasions addressed
the legality of foreign forces in Afghanistan. Yet the Security Council’s Chapter VII resolutions
are best seen as either authorizing the presence of a multinational force designed to stabilize
Afghanistan (without having as its mission counter-terrorism operations, let alone operations
outside Afghanistan), or simply recognizing the inherent right of self-defense of the United
States and its allies. The inherent right of self-defense (individual and collective) does justify
U.S. cross-border operations that respond to raids by militants from Pakistan into Afghanistan, so
long as the U.S. operations remain necessary and proportionate to the threat of those raids, and
so long as the Afghan government consents to the presence of U.S. forces. Such self-defense
would also support unilateral uses of U.S. force against Al Qaeda in Pakistan, either in the form
of covert operations by special forces units or the launching of Predators from Afghanistan to
strike at targets in Pakistan, so long as it can be shown that those Al Qaeda targets are ones that
are supporting the cross-border raids into Pakistan, and so long as Pakistan is unwilling or unable
to prevent Al Qaeda’s support for those raids.
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A broader right of self-defense against Al Qaeda targets in Pakistan based on the attacks
of 9/11, however, is far more problematic, since the requirements of necessity and
proportionality likely preclude unilateral uses of force against a third state that was not
implicated in those attacks. In general, the jus ad bellum recognizes important rights of a
defending state to maintain its security against the violence of a non-state actor, but those values
must coexist with the rights of other states to their own security, rights that are not lost simply
because the remnants of a dangerous non-state actor turn up on their territory. While
circumstances may change in the future that could justify unilateral uses of U.S. force against
Pakistan for the broader threat Al Qaeda poses to the United States, the jus ad bellum at present
requires the United States, when pursuing that objective, to cooperate with the government of
Pakistan in finding and neutralizing Al Qaeda, not unilateral attacks through covert missions and
missile strikes by the United States without Pakistani consent.

